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 Introduction  
 
Arran Gare and Wayne Hudson 
Contemporary naturalism is changing and scientific reductionism is under challenge from those 
who advocate a more comprehensive outlook. This special issue of Telos, based on the first 
Telos Australia Symposium held at Swinburne University in Melbourne in February 2014, 
introduces some of the key questions in the current debates. It also poses the question of whether 
more satisfactory political and social thought can be produced if scientific reductionism is 
replaced by a richer and more hermeneutical naturalism, one that takes more account of 
philosophical anthropology, actual co-involvements of human beings and their environments, 
and the potential of more naturalistically grounded approaches to culture. 
 
The contemporary naturalist challenge is to overcome the one sided and predominantly 
mechanistic naturalism coming from seventeenth century Europe. At one level, this is a 
philosophical issue about how best to interpret the natural sciences and the world to which they 
relate. At another level, however, it is about developing a rationalism capable of providing a 
basis for ethics, education and aesthetics. If our civilization continues to uncritically accept 
mechanistic and reductionist versions of naturalism, then it is unlikely to be able to solve the 
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massive problems that confront it---from economic development to international security to 
climate change. On the other hand, if a richer and more inclusive naturalism can be developed 
without losing the explanatory purchase and knowledege accumulation characteristic of the 
modern natural sciences, then we may be able to overcome the agnosticism about goals and 
values that deforms the contemporary West. Aiming for a richer naturalism does not, of course, 
mean downplaying human historicity and plasticity. Nor does it imply that civilized life can be 
made or sustained without high levels of cultural meaning that are creations rather than 
representations of a fixed or static natural order. 
 
In our view progress towards a richer naturalism can be made by recognizing the philosophical 
weaknesses of mechanistic and reductionist forms of naturalism, by understanding the 
interactions between the development of Western discourses and political and economic 
developments, and by taking sustained account of recent developments across the sciences which 
suggest that more holistic perspectives that do not eliminate the human from the natural world 
can add explanatory power, not least in physics and biology. The approach we advocate implies 
that the standard separations between human experience and the natural world and between fact 
and value are unsound. These separations arose with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth 
century and became pervasive after the work of David Hume and the emergence of Kantian and 
neo-Kantian philosophy, with its separation of pure from practical reason. Subsequently neo-
Kantians, Positivists and Logical Empiricists all directed Western thought away from value-
based engagement with the universe and this arguably had deleterious effects upon both human 
cultural development and on the environment, widely conceived to include both sentient and 
insentient nature.  
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Following the rise of Kantianism and the marginalization of the natural law tradition of political, 
legal and ethical thought, it came to be widely accepted in liberal societies in the West that ethics 
and political philosophy should be founded on practical reason without recourse to claims about 
the natural order. The ‘supernaturalism of reason’ Kantians promoted was often presented as a 
liberation from dogmatic metaphysics, but it also encouraged a detachment from the results of 
the actual sciences since questions of practical reason were independent of them. Kantianism was 
not, of course, the only trend. At the end of the nineteenth century the British Idealists, especially 
T. H. Green (1836-1882), produced substantive political and social philosophy. The  British 
Idealists lost their adherents however, in the early to mid twentieth century, partly because they 
failed to confront Darwinian evolution and Social Darwinism, and their intellectual influence has 
waned ever since, although the reform movements they engendered did not peak until the third 
quarter of the twentieth century. 
 
Partitional thinking also played a major role in analytical philosophy. Thus the British 
philosopher G.E. Moore (1873-1958) famously argued that drawing conclusions from 
descriptions of what is the case to conclusions about what is good involved what he called ‘the 
naturalistic fallacy’. The Logical Positivists reformulated this opposition as the claim that there 
was an unbridgeable gulf between facts, the domain of objective knowledge, and values, the 
domain of subjective preferences. Such views were especially influential in the United States, 
where subliminal social Darwinism shaped political, social and economic policy after World 
War Two. A form of social Darwinism was also influential in the Communist world where, 
despite socialist rhetoric, economic formations, institutions and technology were, evaluated 
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according to how successfully they facilitated the domination of nature and people. Rejecting 
this crude instrumentalism, most Western Marxists followed the Hungarian Marxist Györgi 
Lukács (1885-1871) and treated nature as a social category, even though a much richer approach 
had been advanced by the German Jewish philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885-1977).  Once again 
there were negative consequences for social and economic thought. Many gave up criticizing 
economists and accepted the economists’ portrayal of themselves as contributors to a positive 
science concerned with objective truth about what was required to regulate the economy 
efficiently. Critical theory, as developed by the Frankfurt School, came to be dominated by 
cultural studies and later discourse ethics. Neither in the capitalist world of the West nor in the 
allegedly socialist East were there powerful discourses that integrated political, social and 
economic thought with the actual results of the sciences studying nature. There were, to be fair, 
contributions to natural law-based sociology and economics from Catholic philosophers, most 
obviously Heinrich Pesch (1854-1926), but they too were weak on the outcomes of the actual 
sciences, even though they sometimes invoked them at an expert level in the defence of theism 
and in bioethics. 
 
More recently philosophy has continued to be relatively weak in its criticism of inadequate forms 
of naturalism and the sciences based on them. Some philosophical tendencies—phenomenology 
and hermeneutics, for example—have been critical of scientism, but they have not engaged in 
depth with the results of the actual natural sciences. Process philosophers, to be fair, have done 
somewhat better, but have been marginalized and ignored by most mainstream philosophers. In 
the late twentieth century most philosophers have carried on in social, political and ethical 
philosophy, and occasionally in aesthetics, as though the development of the sciences were of no 
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relevance to their work, or have defended the cognitive claims of mainstream natural sciences 
and mathematics, relatively unconcerned with the implications of this way of understanding the 
world for humanity. Few philosophers have faced up to the demise of the humanities, their 
cognitive status and the values they strove to uphold. They have also offered no effective 
resistance to the collapse of the Humboldtian model of the university and the status it accorded 
the liberal arts and the humanities. 
 
Currently the ground seems to be shifting. More and more contemporary thinkers recognize the 
misguided nature of the Kantian turn towards representation and away from the actual natural 
world in which human beings are located. In addition, more and more considerations are brought 
to bear that arguably favour a more naturalist but non-reductive approach to the management of 
both human affairs and the environment.  In this issue of Telos we seek to articulate this new 
naturalist challenge and to provoke discussion about its political, social and economic 
implications. If the natural sciences move beyond reductionism and mechanism, new 
perspectives open up, especially if philosophy can rise to the challenge of thinking a naturalism 
that does not de-legitimate the agency of human beings or the importance of experiences of 
natural beings.  Given an enriched naturalism, it may also be possible to question the view that 
objective knowledge of the natural world can have no bearing on values. Rather, the editors of 
this special edition believe that Ernst Bloch was right to attempt to revive a radicalized version of 
the natural law tradition as an alternative to Western subjectivism about values and morality. 
Where most Western Marxists provided almost no political philosophy and only rudimentary 
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conceptions of nature,1 Bloch called for a radicalized Aristotelianism, and revived interest in the 
work of Avicenna and what he called ‘the Aristotelian Left’.2 He also reasserted the 
extraordinary importance of the German philosopher Schelling (1775-1854) at a time when he 
was largely rejected as a mystical reactionary by Marxists. Building on these precedents, he 
defended a version of natural law that justified human dignity and offered hope for the future, 
partly because it took scientific knowledges about the nature of physical existence and human 
life seriously. Whether some form of natural law can be defended in contemporary terms remains 
to be seen, but it seems certain that only an approach that recognizes both human creativity and 
freedom and our location in nature will be adequate in the twenty first century. Obviously it will 
be important to avoid overstatement and scientific Romanticism. On the other hand, new ideas 
about naturalism should be allowed to emerge, even though they may subsequently require 
reformulation and correction. 
 
The contributors to this issue write from a variety of political, philosophical and scientific 
standpoints. They all agree, however, that a civilization based on reductionist naturalism with its 
impoverished understanding of both human life and the universe, will fail to generate the 
political and social thought we need. The first four papers in this special edition address the 
status of naturalism in contemporary philosophy. To begin, Arran Gare criticizes analytical 
philosophy as a form of neo-Kantianism that minimises any role for synopsis and eliminates any 
role for synthesis in philosophical thinking and confuses naturalism with reductionist scientism. 
                                                        
1 See Ernst Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity trs. Dennis J.Schmidt (Cambridge:MIT 
Press, 1987) and John Ely, ‘Ernst Bloch, Natural Rights, and the Greens’, Minding Nature: The 
Philosophers of Ecology, ed. David Macauley, New York: The Guilford Press, 1966, chap.6. 
2Ernst Bloch, Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke (1952) reprinted in Das Materialismus 
Problem Seine Geschichte und Substanz Gesamtausgabe vol 7 (Frankfurt a. M.:Suhrkamp, 1972) 
pp 479-546. 
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Drawing on the neglected work of the British philosopher C. D. Broad, he argues for a new form 
of speculative naturalism which gives a place to philosophers facing the challenge of developing 
new forms of non-reductionist science to overcome the incoherence and failures of reductionist 
science. Gare claims that such a richer naturalism of this sort can align science with the 
humanities and provide a basis for new approaches to politics, education, economics and the 
environment. In the second paper Wayne Hudson advocates an inclusive speculative naturalism 
that allows that a range of differential naturalisms may have some value.  He suggests that this 
speculative naturalism can be tempered by ‘theology’, appropriately defined, and can contribute 
to a recovery of utopia on philosophical anthropological principles. In the third paper David 
Macarthur develops an innovative liberal form of philosophical naturalism that does justice to 
natural non-scientific things, including people, action, art, reasons, and ordinary objects. His 
paper attempts to solve the so-called ‘placement problem’ raised by scientific reductionism. In 
the fifth paper Greg Melleuish and Susanna Rizzo argue that naturalism has to take account of 
the mutability of the ways in which human beings interact with the world, both in terms of ideas 
and the modes of understanding they adopt in order to relate to the world.  They question more 
absolutist versions of naturalism and argue that naturalism needs to be rooted in the plasticity of 
human nature and its limitations. 
The next group of papers is concerned with theoretical developments in the sciences that 
arguably favour a post-reductionist naturalism, one that is not hostile to the humanities or to 
experience.  In the fifth paper Lenny Moss argues that Critical Theory requires an account of the 
emergence of normativity within nature itself and then provides a novel evolutionary 
anthropology, based on natural detachment, which goes some way in this direction. His 
discussion breaks new ground.  
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Then, in an erudite paper, David Pan discusses the importance of cultural and biological 
processes where intentionality and thus teleology are an issue, and makes connections between 
Kant’s views in the Critique of Judgement and the recent work of Terence Deacon. In the 
seventh paper Maurita Harney advocates an ontology of nature which encompasses meaning.  
She finds resources for an alternative to reductionism in a phenomenological naturalism which 
takes as its point of departure Merleau-Ponty’s later ‘ontology of nature’ and is further enriched by 
Peirce’s semiotics. Harney draws on contemporary biosemiotics to propose a naturalist semiotic 
approach to mind which does not separate the human being from the natural world.  In the eight 
paper Freya Matthews locates ecophilosophy, with its rejection of dualism and attempt to restore 
meaning, purpose, agency, will and  intentionality  to nature, within the speculative naturalist 
tradition.  Matthews urges the need to move from the specular to the ontopoetic. A radical 
engagement with irreducible immanence is needed, she argues, one that recognizes that the 
problem of duality arises within discursive thinking itself. 
 
The last three papers attempt to rethink ethics and politics on the basis of post-reductionist 
naturalism. In the ninth paper Peter Corning argues that a scientifically-grounded framework for 
social justice can now be developed on the basis of recent scientific findings in a range of 
disciplines. He claims that a biosocial contract can be generated from three complementary 
normative principles – equality, equity, and reciprocity--each of which can now be understood as 
having a basis in nature. In the tenth paper Jeff Klooger explores unexpected convergences 
between the anti-naturalism of the social philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis and the recent work 
of Terence Deacon. He shows that careful exegesis reveals many points of contact, despite the 
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different disciplinary orientations of the two authors. In the eleventh paper Coffman and 
Mikulecky, building on their controversial monograph, Global Insanity (2012), argue that the 
contemporary assumption that everything must be sacrificed to economic growth rests on 
scientific reductionist naturalism and that Robert Rosen’s work on complexity offers an 
alternative naturalism which can lead to better political, social and environmental outcomes. 
 
Clearly the ground covered is vast and the technical issues raised are many. We see this issue of 
Telos as an invitation to debate and controversy, rather than as the final word of matters of 
national and international importance. 
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Arran Gare 
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